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INTRODUCTION
NADINE STROSSEN*

The following "Dialogue" consists of ten essays by expert Supreme
Court-watchers from a broad range of professional and ideological
perspectives. The essays focus on Professor James Simon's important and
provocative book about the Rehnquist Court, The Center Holds: The
Power Struggle Inside the Rehnquist Court,1 and on his even more
provocative Solomon Lecture.' In the Solomon Lecture, Simon defends
and extends the book's central thesis that the Rehnquist Court has not
sharply limited prior rulings protecting constitutional rights.' While the
book had assessed the Court's record through its 1993-94 Term, the
Solomon Lecture, delivered in October 1995, defends the book's
conclusion even in light of the Court's 1994-95 Term, 4 with its series of
decisions that curbed constitutional rights in several key areas, 5 notably
racial justice. 6
In light of the widely varying perspectives of the Dialogue's
contributors, it is not surprising that they differ dramatically in their
assessments of Simon's analysis, and also offer widely divergent analyses
* Professor of Law, New York Law School; National President, American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU). Professor Strossen gratefully acknowledges the research and
administrative assistance of Raafat (Ralph) S. Toss, a 1995 graduate of New York Law
School. Although Strossen is the National President of the ACLU, which has
participated in many of the Supreme Court cases discussed in this Dialogue, the purpose
of this Introduction is not to set forth Strossen's (or the ACLU's) views, but rather, to
provide a neutral overview of the Dialogue.
1. JAMES F. SIMON, THE CENTER HOLDS: THE POWER STRUGGLE INSIDE THE
REHNQUIST COURT (1995).
2. James F. Simon, Politics and the Rehnquist Court, delivered as the Sixth Annual
Solomon Lecture at New York Law School (Oct. 31, 1995), in 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv.
863 (1996).
3. Id. at 1-2.
4. Id. at 8-10.
5. See, e.g., Charles Fried, The Supreme Court, 1994 Term: Foreword:
Revolutions?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 13 (1995); Linda Greenhouse, High Court, Changing
Recent Course, Makes it HarderforPrisonersto Sue, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1995, at B7;
Linda Greenhouse, Justices, 5 to 4, Cast Doubts on U.S. Programs That Give
Preferences Based on Race, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1995, at Al; Linda Greenhouse,
Justices Say Making State Pay in DesegregationCase was Error,N.Y. TIMES, June 13,
1995, at Al; Linda Greenhouse, In Step on Racial Policy, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1995,
at Al.
6. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995); Miller v. Johnson, 115
S. Ct. 2475 (1995); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
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of their own. The Dialogue's distinguished contributors include: leading
Supreme Court journalists who write for publications with, and who
themselves espouse, starkly contrasting ideological orientations; the legal
directors of two leading advocacy organizations that often appear before
the Supreme Court, usually on the opposite sides of the same case-the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), which appears before the
Supreme Court more frequently than any entity other than the U.S.
government, and the American Center for Law and Justice (ACLJ), the
legal arm of the Christian Coalition, which Pat Robertson deliberately
created to be the "counter-ACLU," as indicated by its intentionally similar
initials; 7 scholars who analyze the Court from the vantage-point of their
different academic disciplines-history, political science, and philosophy;
and a former United States Attorney General who played an active role in
the judicial selection process during the Reagan Administration, and who
has spoken and written extensively about the Court.
While centering on whether the Rehnquist Court's center is, in fact,
holding, the Dialogue encompasses broader issues as well, about both the
Rehnquist Court and the role of the Supreme Court in general. Given the
contributors' vigorous defense of strongly differing perspectives and
conclusions on every topic addressed, perhaps the only safe overarching
conclusion is the observation by Steven Shapiro, Legal Director of the
ACLU, that "Supreme Court watching, like Kremlin watching, is
endlessly fascinating but notoriously unreliable."8
Shapiro's reason for this conclusion, and for his accordingly
ambivalent answer to the question whether "the center holds," is that "the
Supreme Court is far too complex a body to be captured by a single
phrase embodied in a single year's headline (or book title)." 9 Despite
their very different ideological perspective, Jay Sekulow, Legal Director
of the ACLJ, and his co-author John Tuskey, nevertheless share Shapiro's
ambivalence toward this core question, explaining that "the 'center' lies
in the eye of the beholder." 10
The range of the thought-provoking, opinionated essays in this
collection is indicated by the following sampling of the many questions
they explore, all of which are answered and analyzed in widely varying
ways by the different contributors:
7. See Gustav Niebuhr, Conservatives'NewFrontier:ReligiousLiberty Law Firms,
N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 1995, at A12; Michael deCourcy Hinds, Robertson Trying Again
to Put Prayerin Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1993, at A12.
8. Steven R. Shapiro, The CenterHolds, But Where is the Center? A Response to
James Simon, 40 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 935 (1996).
9. Id. at 937.

10. Jay Alan Sekulow & John Tuskey, The "Center" is in the Eye of the Beholder,
40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 945 (1996).
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"

How should one mark "the center" in assessing the Supreme
Court? Should it be measured in terms of public opinion,
Congressional views, past Courts, and/or in other terms?

* Is the Court's center "holding," as Simon maintains? Or, rather,
has the Court moved too far to the right? Or too far to the left?
•

Was the Court's decision in Planned Parenthoodof Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey" a victory for the center? Or for the
"pro-life" right? Or for the "pro-choice" left? 2

*

Regardless of how one assesses Casey itself, how typical was it,
and how indicative of the Court's overall (non)movement
regarding constitutional rights? In other words, was Casey either
a centrist ruling or a central one?

*

Are other controversial decisions that the Court has recently
issued-for example, in the areas of race, religion, and
federalism-right or wrong? Right or left? Or moderate?

*

Are the Justices who are most commonly described as
"centrist"-Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter-really
moderate? Or are they, rather, conservative, liberal, or in some
other category altogether?

" Is our nation best served by a centrist Court? Or would we be
better served by a Court that moves toward either the left or the
right?
* To what extent should the Court be bound by stare decisis? Has
the Rehnquist Court overturned precedents more often than it
should do so, or less often? And has the Rehnquist Court
overturned precedents more often than previous Courts, or less
often?

11. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
12. I put the terms "pro-life" and "pro-choice" in quotes to indicate that these are
the preferred labels that many advocates on each side use to describe their respective
positions. Recognizing that advocates in both camps have criticized their adversaries'
labels as inaccurate and misleading, I'm following the neutral approach of honoring each
group's preferred self-description.
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To what extent is the Court actually overturning more precedents
than those it explicitly reverses, by severely curtailing their
scope?

* To what extent should the Court interpret the Constitution in light
of historical understandings, and to what extent in terms of
conceptions of justice or other considerations?
*

Does the Court's significant reduction in the number of cases it
has been hearing in recent terms constitute an abandonment of its
responsibility to enforce constitutional rights?

To illustrate the divergent views that the Dialogue contributors
espouse on the foregoing questions and others they address, I'll cite some
examples here:
*

Whereas Meese, 3 and Sekulow and Tuskey a criticize the
Rehnquist Court for interpreting constitutional rights too broadly,
Eisler, 5 MacKenzie 6 and Shapiro17 make the opposite
critique.

*

Whereas Sekulow and Tuskey assail Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey as an extreme pro-choice
ruling,"8 Shapiro criticizes it as severely limiting the rights of
reproductive freedom 9 recognized in Roe v. Wade.'

*

Whereas MacKenzie defends the Court's fifty-year-old pattern, set
in United States v. Carolene Products Co.," of "valu[ing] . ..
civil rights and individual liberties [somewhat higher] than claims
based on property, contract and commerce,"' Pilon castigates

13. Edwin Meese HI, The Illusion of the Rehnquist Court's PoliticalAgenda: A
Return to ConstitutionalInterpretationFrom JudicialLaw-Making, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L.

REV. 925 (1996).
14. Sekulow & Tuskey, supra note 10.

15. Kim I. Eisler, A Defense of Activism, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 911 (1996).
16.
17.
18.
19.

John P. MacKenzie,
Shapiro, supra note
Sekulow & Tuskey,
Shapiro, supra note

The Legal Culture, 40 N.Y.L. SCH.L. Rnv. 903 (1996).
8.
supra note 10, at 960.
8, at 941.

20. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
21. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
22. MacKenzie, supra note 16, at 905.
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this "bifurcated theory of rights and review. "I Accordingly,
while MacKenzie laments the current Court's willingness to
elevate the importance of property, contract, and commerce
relative to human rights, Pilon praises that development.
" Whereas Pilon reads the Court's recent moves toward curbing the
power of federal government as "glimmers of hope" 24 and
"moves in the right direction,"' a judgment joined in by
Meese,' in contrast, MacKenzie 7 and Shapiro regard these
same developments as alarming danger signals.
*

Whereas Sekulow and Tuskey applaud the Court's decision in
Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of the University of
Virginia,29 ordering the University of Virginia to fund a student
evangelical magazine and overturning the lower courts' rulings
that such funding would violate the Establishment Clause,3" and
describe this ruling as "centrist or moderate," 3 Shapiro
characterizes it as significantly departing from constitutional
principles and precedents, and as "the first time that the Supreme
Court had ever upheld direct government funding for a religious

activity. "32
*

Indeed, Sekulow and Tuskey maintain that notwithstanding
Rosenberger and a series of other recent cases upholding free
speech rights for religious expression in public institutions and
rejecting arguments that such expression violates the
Establishment Clause,33 the Court still does not sufficiently

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Roger Pilon, A Court Without a Compass, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 999 (1996).
Id. at 1011.
Id.
Meese, supra note 13, at 925.
MacKenzie, supra note 16, at 909-10.
Shapiro, supra note 8, at 942-43.
115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510

(1995).
Sekulow & Tuskey, supra note 10, at 946.
Shapiro, supra note 8, at 941.
Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995);
Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993);
Westside Community Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990); Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263 (1981).
31.
32.
33.
Lamb's
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protect religious expression, and gives too broad a scope to the
Establishment Clause.' In contrast, Shapiro intimates that the
Court has over-protected religious expression and under-enforced
Establishment Clause principles.35
* Whereas MacKenzie36 and Shapiro37 criticize the Court's recent
decisions striking down legislative redistricting plans drawn to
insure minority representation as endangering racial justice, Eisler
applauds these rulings, because he regards the embattled
redistricting plans as "a throwback to apartheid." 38
*

Whereas Garrow chastises most observers for having overstated
the significance of the Casey decision in assessing the Rehnquist
Court's overall direction, since he regards that ruling as
"unrepresentative rather than typical,"39 Sekulow and Tuskey
see Casey as "an example of the 'abortion distortion' that has
infected" the Court's entire constitutional jurisprudence. 4'

*

Whereas Meese praises Chief Justice Rehnquist and his allies for
their "dedication to precedent and stability,"'"
MacKenzie
upbraids them as "[t]he new revolutionaries" who "upset old
precedents. "42

*

Whereas Meese lauds the Rehnquist Court for respecting
precedent43 and assails the Warren Court for "engaging in the
wholesale upheaval of existing law,"' O'Brien maintains that

34. Sekulow & Tuskey, supra note 10.

35. Shapiro, supra note 8, at 941.
36. MacKenzie, supra note 16, at 905.

37. Shapiro, supra note 8, at 939.
38. Eisler, supra note 15, at 923.
39. David J. Garrow, Simple Simon: Supremely Sanguine, Supremely Stubborn, 40

N.Y.L.
40.
41.
42.
43.

SCH. L. RV. 969 (1996).
Sekulow & Tuskey, supra note 10, at 946.
Meese, supra note 13, at 931.
MacKenzie, supra note 16, at 906.
Meese, supra note 13, at 927.

44. Id.
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the Rehnquist Court has been overturning precedents at a faster
rate than the Warren Court did.4'
0

Whereas Denniston praises the current Justices as "no less
interesting, and as a group no less worthy," than those on any
previous Court,'
Eisler pillories the current Court's
"mediocrity,"47 and characterizes the seated Justices as "non
50
49
descript,"1 "bland," and "vacuous."

" Whereas Denniston celebrates the unpredictable nature of the
Court's centrist Justices, and hence the Court itself, as "a mark
of character, not of weakness,"" Rosen lambastes the
unpredictability of one of the centrist Justices, Sandra Day
O'Connor, as "simply self-aggrandizing."'
*

Whereas Eisler praises Justices O'Connor and Souter for their
philosophical evolutions since joining the Court, 3 Meese
complains "that Justice Souter has not always met the high hopes
of his appointer." M

Regardless of Eisler's and Meese's contrasting views about Justice
Souter's rulings, surely they would both have to agree with his concluding
observation in his dissenting opinion in United States v. Lopez,5' since
it underscores the difficulty of predicting the long-run significance of any
Supreme Court decision, and hence serves as an appropriate epigraph for
this Dialogue: "[Today's decision may be seen as only a misstep, ...
45. David M. O'Brien, Charting the Rehnquist Court's Course: How the Center
Folds, Holds, and Shifts, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 981 (1996).
46. Lyle Denniston, The Center Moves, The CenterRemains, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 877 (1996).
47. Eisler, supra note 15, at 917.
48. Id. at 921.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Denniston, supra note 46, at 880.
52. Jeffrey Rosen, Who Cares?, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 899 (1996).
53. Eisler, supra note 15, at 922 n.29.
54. Meese, supra note 13, at 930.
55. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
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but hardly an epochal case. I would not argue otherwise, but I would
raise a caveat. Not every epochal case has come in epochal trappings."56
Likewise, regardless of the contributors' divergent views about
Professor Simon's book and lecture-indeed, precisely because of those
richly varied views stimulated by Simon's observations-they, along with
all other Court-watchers, would have to agree that Simon has provided an
intellectual feast, as the following pages attest.

56. Id. at 1657.

